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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
N. P, COMPANY, a Utah

J, J,

limited partnership,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES,
the

Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 17183
)

NATURE OF THE CASE
The action was originally brought by Plaintiff-Appellant
challenging the constitutionality of Section 23-15-10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, which prohibits the maintenance of
private fish installations on any of the natural waters of the
state.

The State of Utah counterclaimed for a declaratory judg-

ment to the effect that the statute in question was valid as an
effort to protect public recreational rights in the natural
waters of the state.

DISPOSITION JN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court ruled that Section 23-15-10, Utah Code
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Annotated 1953, as amended, was fully constitutional and that
the state's denial of Appellant's private f'is h ins
· t a 11 ation pern:i•
was necessary and proper.

The court also found that the

road~

to Lake Canyon was a public road.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent State of Utah seeks a complete affirnance of
the lower court's judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a limited partnership created under the laws
of the State of Utah which owns a large tract of land in Duchesne
County.
Lake Canyon Lake is a natural lake located in Duchesne
County, approximately ten (10) miles up from the mouth of Lake
Canyon.

The lake is approximately 800 yards long and 200 yards

wide, with a mean depth of 17 feet and a maximum depth of 33
feet (R. 40, 51, 106-107, 178).
The State of Utah has managed Lake Canyon Lake as a public
fishery, and the general public has used the lake as a public
fishery, for nearly half a century.

The state's management

program has included eradication measures to eliminate trash fi~
stocking game fish (trout), setting seasons and creel limits, la'i
enforcement inspection and control, and similar measures (R. 376·
377, 391-392, 394, 178).

The evidence does not reveal when the

general public first began to use the lake for recreational pu~
poses, but David Thomas, a lifelong resident of Duchesne couney,
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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testified that he began Zishing the lake in the early 1930's
and that the general public has fished there since then (R. 375376).

The lake has attracted sportsmen not only from the Uinta

Basin but from many parts of the state, including Carbon County
and areas along the Wasatch Front, and these sportsmen have
included organized groups, such as Boy Scouts (R. 392-393).
Public fishing activities have included winter ice fishing
(R. 392-393).

The lake, because of its size and depth, is capable

of sustaining various forms of water-based recreation other than
fishing, such as boating and waterfowl hunting.

The evidence

was uncontroverted that the Division of Wildlife Resources used
a 16-foot boat with a 25 horsepower engine to poison the lake
for trash fish in 1973 (R. 377-378).

There was even evidence

that during the winter a small plane had actually landed on the
frozen surface of the lake and later took off (R. 394-395).

For

the convenience of the Court, several pictures showing the lake,
its surrounding area and ice fishing and stocking activities
which are in evidence (R. 44-47) have been photocopied and appear
in this brief as Figures 1 through 6 at pages 2a, 4a, and 6a.
The land surrounding Lake Canyon Lake is in private ownership and is now owned by Appellant (R. 302) . From 1969 through
1978 an agreement existed between the State of Utah and the owner
of the land surrounding the lake (Appellant's predecessor in
interest) , whereby, inter alia, the landowner allowed public access
on and across lands adjacent to the lake in order to fish the
lake, and the state confined the fishing season to the winter

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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months

(ice fishing)

so that fishermen would not disturb the

landowner's summer grazing of livestock (Defendant's Exhibit
20, found at R. 42-43, R. 379-381, 400-401, 178).
Over the years appellant has acquired legal or equitable
ownership of approximately 1,200 acres of land in or near Lake
Canyon, and in 1978 acquired the land surrounding Lake Canyon
Lake (R. 302).

Shortly after such acquisition, Appellant filed

an application with the Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources
for a permit to operate a private fish installation on Lake

CB~

Lake for the propagation of fish for the private control and use
of Plaintiff.

Such permit was denied by the Division pursuant

to Section 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for
the reason that Lake Canyon Lake was a natural lake, and the
statute prohibits the maintenance of a private fish installation
on any natural lake or stream.
The Appellant has filed three diligence water rights on

U~

Canyon Lake for stockwatering purposes, but has no rights to
actually divert water from the lake (R. 341-342).

However, s~a

the use of Lake Canyon Lake for recreational purposes would not
require any diversion of water from the lake, such uses could
not interfere with any existing water rights on, above or below
the lake (R. 179).
There is a lower pond or lake in Lake Canyon, approximate~
seven miles below Lake Canyon Lake, which is also a natural la~
(R. 301).

Donald Andriano, Chief of Fisheries for the Division

of Wildlife Resources, testified that a permit for a private
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Figure 4.

Stocking Trout-Lake Canyon Lake

fish installation had been issued for this lower lake some time
prior to 1971, when Section 23-15-10 was amended to provide for
the first

time that private fish installations could not be

authorized on any natural watercourse, and that the permit has
been renewed annually, even after the 1971 amendment.

Mr. Andriana

said that such annual renewals had been issued because the owner
of the permit had made substantial and expensive installations
prior to 1971, in reliance on continued private pond statutes
for the lower lake.

Mr. Andriana said that he did not know of

any legal opinion as to whether the 1971 statute contemplated
any "grandfather" rights for continuation of pre-1971 permits
on natural watercourses, but said that until there was such a
legal determination, such permits probably would be renewed by
the Division as a matter of equity because of the pre-1971
expenditures.

He said he did not know how many permits were in

that category, but his estimate would be no more than half a
dozen (R. 421-424).
Mr. Andriana also testified that the reason behind Section
23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, was to protect
private individuals from converting public bodies of water to
their own private use, even though public access to surrounding
land could be denied (R. 423).
Finally, Appellant attempted to show that the public did not
have access up the Lake Canyon Road because it was a private
road.

However, the evidence showed that Duchesne County has

for more than ten years graded and maintained this road as a
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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public road for public use from the mouth of the canyon to the
forest boundary above the lake.

The road has been used as a

public road by members of the public for nearly fifty years for
various recreational and other purposes, including access
National Forest (R. 356-359, 363-364, 395-396).

tot~

There was no

evidence of any interruption or interference with this public
use other than the testimony of Mr. R. J. Pinder to the effect
that he had tried to restrict access in 1978 by placing locks
on a gate across the road, but that county officials or others
promptly removed the locks in each instance within a period of
not more than 24 hours and that after about two weeks of such
futile efforts, he gave up trying to restrict access (R. 335-336,
395-396) .
After a trial and arguments, the lower court issued its
Memorandum Decision (R. 164-165) and Findings of Fact, Conclusior.·
of Law and Decree (R. 177-184).

The Court held that Section 2H·:

was not unconstitutional, because it was a valid legislative atte:
to protect public recreational rights in the natural waters of tr.;
state.

The Court further held that the Division of Wildlife

Resources had properly denied Appellant's application for a pri·
vate fish installation permit (R. 180-181).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 23-15-10 u.c.A. IS VALID AND PROPER AS AN ATTEMPT
BY THE LEGISLATURE TO PROTECT Pl'BLIC RIGHTS IN THE WATERS OF THE
STATE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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A.

Introduction
At this juncture, it would be helpful to briefly review

the issues of the case.

The basic relief sought by Appellant is

~or a declaratory judgment that Section 23-15-10, Utah Code Anno-

tated 1953, as amended violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution in that it prohibits the maintenance of
private fish installations on natural lakes and streams while
allowing such installations on off-stream, artificial impoundments.

Appellant claims that the distinction set forth in the

statute is arbitrary and unreasonable.
The statute was passed primarily to protect the rights of
the public to use the natural waters of the state for recreational
and other purposes (R. 423).

Thus, the statute was passed to

protect against the exact situation which Appellant seeks to bring
about on Lake Canyon Lake.
While the courts of Utah have clearly recognized public
rights in natural watercourses, they have not been called upon
to define the dimensions of the rights of the public to utilize
the natural waters of the state for recreational purposes.

The

Legislature has also recognized such public rights and has been
more explicit than the courts, and the statute in question is
simply one example of legislative protection of such public rights.
The public rights in the natural waters of the state exist
regardless of who owns or controls the lands surrounding these
waters.

Therefore, issues as to whether the road up Lake Canyon

is a public right-of-way, and whether Appellant controls the
-7-
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access to Lake Canyon Lake, have no legal relevance to the pub[;
recreational servitude on the lake itself.

Nevertheless, it

will be seen that the road is a public road, but that Appellant
does control access to the lake.
Appellant would have the Court believe that Section 23-15-l
unconstitutionally denies it the right to use Lake Canyon Lake
as a private fish farm; a right it claims by virtue of its owner·
ship of the surrounding real property.

But to the contrary,

Appellant in fact is seeking to convert a public lake into a
private fish farm for its own use, and to extinguish the inherer:
rights of the public to use the natural waters of the state for
recreational purposes.

This is the exact result the challenged

statute seeks to avoid and the very reason the statute was enact'
The statute in question is clearly constitutional.

The sta:

holds all waters in trust for the people, and, while the water

i:

in its natural state as a lake or stream, the public in common
has a right to utilize the water in its natural state for recrea·
tional or other purposes.

Such waters in their natural state afi

not subject to private ownership.

The subject statute merely

prohibits private ownership and use of natural watercourses to
protect public rights that have existed since

statehood~and

before.
B.

The Equal Protection Clause Does Not Prevent a State
From Classifying Its Police Powers So Long as There
Is a Rational Basis for Such Classification.
It is recognized that the Equal Protection Clause, whk

the Appellant claims Section 23-15-10 is violative of, does not
prevent the state from classifying pursuant to its police pow~s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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e~cept

where such classification is done without any rational

basis or is purely arbitrary discrimination.

l>illiams v. Lee

optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Leavy v. Louisiana, 391

u.s.

68 (1968).
Justice Wolfe, speaking for the Utah Supreme Court in State
"

Mason, 78 P. 2d 920, 923

(Utah, 1938), stated:

The discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary.
A classification is never unreasonable
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the
differentiation between classes or subject
matters included as compared to those excluded
from its operation, provided the differentiation
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to
be accomplished by the act.
See also Child v. City of Spanish rork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1975).
The intent of the Legislature to protect the public's rights
in the natural waters of the state provides a rational and proper
basis for distinguishing between fish installations on natural
1,•ersus artificial bodies of water.

Moreover, it is fundamental

that the Court will sustain the constitutionality of a statute
whenever there is a rational basis for doing so.

Williams v.

Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Barr v. liatteo, 355 U.S. 171
(1958); State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah, 1938); Snyder v.
Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915

(1964); and Child v. City of

Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1975).
There certainly is a rational basis for sustaining the statute
in this case, particularly where, as will be shown below, not one
iota of Jl.ppellant's property rights are infringed in any way.

-9-
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C.

The Legislature Has Recognized the Public's Fight to
Use the Waters of the State for Recreational Purposes
The courts of this state have clearly recognized the

public's rights in the waters of the state, but as yet have not
been called upon to define the dimensions thereof.

The Legis-

lature has clearly recognized and provided protection for such
public rights in several respects.

The public's right to use t:-. 0

waters of the state in natural lakes and streams for recreationa:
purposes is a fundamental part of the public trust in such water;
wa~n.

There may well be other public uses and interests in said

The very statute which Appellant challenges as having no
rational reason for distinguishing between natural waters and
private off-channel impoundments was passed for the very

pur~H

of protecting the public rights in the natural waters of the sta:,
which would be impaired or destroyed if private individuals were
allowed to turn natural lakes or streams into private fish insta>
lations where they could raise and harvest their own fish.
The state's ownership of the waters of the state in trust
for the people is unquestioned and is similar to the state's
trust ovmership of wildlife.

In Adams v. Portage Irr. Co., 95

Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648 (1937), the Utah Supreme Court stated at
pages 652-653:
~laters in this state are of two classes, public
waters and private waters.
The latter class is not
onlv subject to exclusive control and ownership,
but.may be used, sold, or wasted.
It consists of
such waters only as have been reduced to actual,
physical possession of an individual by being.taken
into his vessels or storage receptacles.
It is
private property and may be the subject of larceny.
Public waters, on the other hand, are not the

-10-
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subject of larceny.
The title thereto is in the
public; .all are equal owners; that is, have coequal rights therein, and one cannot obtain the
exclusive control thereof.
These waters are the
gift of Providence; they belong to all as nature
placed them or made them available. They are
the waters flowing in natural channels or ponded
in natural lakes and reservoirs. ~he title
thereto is not subject to private acquisition
and barter, even by the federal government or
the state itself . . . no title to the corpus
of.the.wa~er itself has been or can be granted,
while it is naturally flowing, any more than it
can to the air or the wind or the sunshine.
"Such water" said Blackstone, "is . . . like
wild birds on the wing." (Emphasis added).
see also Deseret Livestock v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607
(195 3) •

Appellant asserts that since it owns the land surrounding
and under the lake, it has the exclusive right to use the waters
of the lake for its own private purposes.

Such is not the law.

To use an example, assume that a rancher owned a huge tract of
land and there was a herd of deer which essentially stayed on
that land all year round.

Certainly the rancher could deny

access to persons wishing to hunt the deer and therefore totally
deny the public access to the deer; but just because he controls
access would not allow him to kill all the deer himself, or convert them to his own private property.

The same reasoning applies

to Lake Canyon Lake.
The Legislature has expressly recognized an<l sought to
protect the public's right to utilize the natural waters of the
state for recreational purposes.

The following are examples of

instances where the Legislature, for one reason or another, has
recognized and sought to protect public recreational rights in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the waters of the state.

Section 73-3-8, Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended, provides that the State Engineer, in approv~c
new water applications, must consider the possible affect the
application would have on public recreation:
. where the state engineer
has reason to
believe that an application to appropriate water
will .
. unreasonably affect public recreation
or the natural stream environment, or will orove
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall.be his
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the
application until he shall have investigated the
matter.
If an application does not meet the requirements of this Section, it shall be rejected.
Section 73-3-29, Utah Code ~..nnotated 1953, as amended, pro·
vides that any person wishing to alter, change or relocate the
channel of a natural stream must, under certain circumstances,
obtain a permit from the State Engineer.

Subsection 3 of that

statute provides:
(3)
The state engineer shall, without undue
delay, conduct investigations as may be reasonably
necessary to determine whether the proposed relocation, alteration or change will impair vested
water rights, or will unreasonably affect any
recreational use or the natural stream environment, or will endanger a~uatic wildlife.
If the
proposed relocation, alteration or change will
not impair vested water rights or will not unreasonably or unnecessarily adversely affect any
oublic recreational use or the natural stream
~nvironment, or endanger the aquatic wildlife,
the application shall be approved.
Otherwise,
the application shall be rejected. Provided,
however, the state engineer may approve the
apolication, in whole or in part, or upon any
re~sonable terms and recommendation that will
protect vested water rights and/or any p~blic
recreational use, the natural stream environment and the aquatic wildlife.
(Emphasis added)·
Section 73-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
sets forth the public policy of the state relative to water
pollution:
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ir.c

Whereas the pollution of the waters of this state
constitutes a menace to public health and welfare
creates public nuisances, is harmful to wildlife '
fish and a9uatic ~ife, and impairs domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational and other legitimate beneficial uses of water, and whereas such
pollution is contrary to the best interests of the
state and its policy for the conservation of the
water resources of the state, it is hereby declared
to be the public policy of this state to conserve
the waters of the state and to protect, maintain
and improve the quality thereof for public water
supplies, for the propagation of wildlife, fish
and aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural,
industrial, recreational, and other legitimate
beneficial uses.
(Emphasis added).
The above-cited statutes clearly show that the Legislature
has, in various contexts, recognized and protected public recreational rights in the natural waters of the state.
The very statute in question, Section 23-15-10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, was enacted to protect the same
public rights that Appellant is now attempting to convert to
its private use and ownership.

Don Andriana, Chief of Fisheries

for the Division of Wildlife Resources, testified that he personally drafted the statute prohibiting private fish installations
on natural lakes and streams.

He further testified that the

primary reason the statute was drafted was that numerous people
were seeking permits to place private fish installations on
natural waters, and the Division felt the public's rights in
those waters needed to be protected (R. 422-425).
lature obviously agreed, and the statute was passed.

The LegisSince the

public has inherent rights in the natural waters of the state,
a statute providing protection for those rights is clearly a
valid and constitutional exercise of legislative authority.
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The evidence in this case also makes clear that public
recreational use of Lake Canyon Lake is not merely conjectural
or theoretical.

Numerous witnesses testified that the public

from many parts of the state have used the lake for fishina,
boating and other recreational purposes ever since the 1930's
( R.

375).

Further, the Division of Wildlife Pesources has for

many years exercised its jurisdiction to manaqe Lake Canyon La:·:'
as a trout fishery through stocking, eradication of trash fish,
and issuance of citations when violations occurred (R. 44-47,
376-377, 391-392, 394).

The evidence is clear that Lake Can;1on

Lake is truly a valuable recreational resource for the people o'
the State of Utah, regardless of the present lack of access.
Thus, the natural waters of the state are owned by the
state and held in trust for the people, regardless of who ows
the surrounding land.

The public ownership of the waters of

the state includes, among other thinos, the right to use those
waters for recreational purposes, and the Legislature in this
instance has merely recognized and provided protection for

t~~

recreational rights.
D.

Public Recreational Rights in Hatural Waters Have Lone
Been Recognized By the Courts.
While the Utah Legislature has recognized and sought

~

protect public recreational rights in the natural waters of t~
state, the courts of this state have not been called upon to
directly recognize and define the dimensions of such rights.
However, many other states, including most of the states in the
west, have recognized and upheld such recreational rights on
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two somewhat different theories.

The older theory bases such

public rights on a test of "recreational navigability" or the socalled "pleasure boat test."

This theory is based on a broader

test of navigability than the strict federal test of commercial
navigability.

This test would allow recreational uses of any

waters capable of being floated by recreation craft such as
canoes, etc.
The other test, and the one we feel is more in keeping with
established Utah law on public waters, is the test adopted by
the Wyoming Courts in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (vlyo., 1961).
Under this theory, the state owns all natural watercourses for
whatever lawful uses the public wishes to make of the water,
including recreation.

Under this theory, navigability is totally

irrelevant.
Turning to the older theory, it has been recognized that the
public has rights in natural bodies of water for recreational use,
even where such bodies of water are not deemed navigable under
the well-known federal test of commercial navigability.
The federal test of "navigability-in-fact" for commercial
use of waterways is totally irrelevant to any issue in this case.
It is relevant only for two purposes.

One such purpose is to

determine ownership of the beds of watercourses, and the "federal
question" arises under the Equal Footing Doctrine, which holds
that each state owns title to the beds of all navigable waters
within its borders as a matter of constitutional "equal footing"
among the states.

The other purpose of the federal test is to

determine whether there is federal regulatory authority under
-15-
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the Commerce Clause of the United States constitutes.
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
64

See~

557 (1871), Cnited States v. Utah, 293 li.s.

(1931), and The Montello, 11 Wall. 411 (1370); on reheannc,

20 Wall. 430

(1874).

Thus, the federal test of navigability is

plainly inappropriate as a guide to aid in the disposition of
this case.
However, it mi9ht be noted in pass in er that the federal tes:
was formulated in an age in which waterborne corr.merce was the
only economically important use of inland waters.

With the pas·

sage of time, commerce by barge and steamboat became less and le,
important.

At the same time, with the growth of society, water·

based recreation greatly grew in popularity, and with it grew
recognition of the strong state interest in protecting the right::
of citizens to recreation uses of "non-navigable" waters; "nonnavigable" meaning non-navigable under the federal test.

1

For these reasons, the majority of state jurisdictions haw
found a public right to recreation in public waters, even where
the waters are non-navigable and the subaqueous land is private!•
owned.

Of those states west of the Mississippi which have con-

side red the matter, twelve have so held:

California, People v.

Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr.

People v. Sweetzer, JJ'.

Cal. Rptr.

82

448

(Cal. App. 197),

(Cal. App. 1977); Idaho, Southern Idaho Fish and

Game Assoc. v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (1974);

1 Again, it should be noted, to avoid confusion, that public
riahts in natural waters need not be based on any concept of
na~igability, as will be seen below.
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~innesota,

s.

Elder v.

Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W. 2d 689

(1960); Missouri,

Delcour, 269 S.W. 2d 17 (1954); New Mexico, State v. Red

River Valley Company, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); North Dakota, Roberts
v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622
933

(1921); Oklahoma, Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d

(1969); Oregon, Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936);

South Dakota, Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.N. 821 (1937); Washing-

st

ton, Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015 (195€), Kemp v. Putnam, 288
P.2d 837 (1955); Wyoming, Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (1961);

;.

and Texas, Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W. 2d 127 (Tex .

.c:.

Civ. P.pp. 1937).
One of the earliest cases upholding the public right of
recreation on "non-navigable"

1.I

··r

(non-navigable under the federal

test) waters was made by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lamprey

v. State, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).

The court there applied the so-

called "pleasure-boat test" of navigability, explaining that there
is a public easement for recreational navigation on any body of
water capable of floating small pleasure craft to which there is
lawful access, and that a physical capacity of the waters for
commercial navigation was not required:
Certainly, we do not see why boating or sailing
for pleasure should not be considered navigation,
as well as boating for mere pecuniary profit.
~:any, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of
this state are not adapted to, and probably will
never be used to any great extent for, commercial
navigation; but they are used~and as population
increases and towns and cities are built up in
their vicinity, will be still more used~by the
people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowl~ng,
.
bathing, skating, taking water for dom7sti~, agricultural, and even city purposes, cutting ice, and
other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated.
~o hand over all these
-17-
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lakes to private ownership, under anv old or
narrow test of navigability, would b~ a oreat
wrong upon the public for all time, the ~xtent
of which cannot, perhaps, be even now anticipated.
53 N. W. at 1143 (Emphasis added) .
It should be noted that if a private installation permit he
been granted to the Appellant, it would have had the effect of
turning over one of the state's natural lakes to private owners\
and control.
The "pleasure boat" test has also been applied in Califorr.;o
People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. App. 1971), was an actic:.
to abate the stringing of cables across a river, which hampered
the floating of the river by rafts and canoes.

The California

court noted that while the river was probably not navigable unde:
the federal test, that did not preclude a more liberal state tes:
of navigability for establishing a right of public passage

w~u

the stream was capable of floating small oar-propelled craft. t
People v. Sweetzer, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. App. 1977), the cour:
stated:
In this state the public has a right to use for
boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and all other
recreation purposes, any part of a river that can
be navigated by small recreational or pleasure
boats, even though the river bed is privately
owned.
(Emphasis added).
See also Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. 1955); Forrester
v. Johnson, 127 Pac. 156 (Cal. 1912); and Hitchings v. Del Rio
\·Joods Recreation and Park District, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Cal. P.pp.
1976).
While the public rights in natural waters need be based sol::
on recreational navigability (use of watercraft) , the evidence
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is clear that Lake Canyon Lake is large enough to support and
has supported recreational boating (P.. 377-378, 394-395, 392-393).
Several of our neighboring states have based the public's
recreational rights in the waters of those states on more inclusive
grounds than the recreational navigability test.

They adopt the

concept that public recreational rights are merely one part of
the general rights of the public growing out of the concept that
the state holds title to all waters in trust for the benefit of
the people.

This is a better reasoned theory.

The courts of 1·1yoming in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo.
1961), and New r'.exico in State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d
421 (1945), while acknowledging the "navigability in fact" or
pleasure boat test of navigability, have chosen to find a public
easement for recreation based on the rationale that the state
holds title to all waters in the state in trust for the benefit
of the people, and the people have a right to use the waters while
in natural watercourses of the state for recreational and other
purposes.
Thus, in Day v. Armstrong, supra, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the issue of navigability was irrelevant, because the
public had a right to beneficially use the waters of the state in
natural watercourses for transportation and recreational purposes,
even though the water was located over or flowed across private
property, and the public had an easement to float on the water
over the privately owned bed of the stream.

The court stated:

Irrespective of the ownership of the bed of a
stream or of land upon which there are waters
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or over which waters flow, the State's right to
control and use its own waters as it sees fit is
paramount . . . Thus, the right of every person
over or through whose lands the waters belongino
to the State are found or flow and whose title to waters does not antecede that of the State
is subject to the State's right to use and co~trol
its waters as it sees fit.
(362 P.2d at 144).
(Emphasis added) .
The court went on to state:
The title to waters within this State beino in
the State, in concomitance, it follows that there
must be an easement in behalf of the State for a
right of way through their natural channels for
such waters upon and over lands submerged by them
or across the bed and channels of streams or other
~ollections of waters . . . The waters not being
in trespass upon or over the lands where they
naturally appear, they are available for such
uses by the public of which they are capable.
When waters are able to float craft, they may be
so used. When so floating craft, as a necessary
incident to use, the bed or channel of the waters
may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the
grounding of craft.
Even a right to disembark
and pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles,
and rapids accompanies this riqht of flotation
as a necessary incident to the.full enjoyment
of the public's easer..ent.
(362 P.2d at 145).
(Emphasis added) .
The Idaho Supreme Court developed a rationale supporting a
public recreational easement which adopted elements of both t~
pleasure-boat test and the Wyorning-New t'exico theory based on
public ownership of waters.

Thus, in Southern Idaho Fish and

Game Association v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho,
1974), the Plaintiff-Association sought a declaratory judgment
that there existed a public right to float and fish in a creek
flowing over the Defendant's land.

This claim was made under~

Idaho statute creating such a right of use in waters cat:Jable of
floating a log in excess of six inches in diameter at high wate'.
-20-
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Idaho Code §36-901.

See also Johnson v. ,Johnson, 95 Pac. 499

(Idaho, 1908).
The Idaho court found a public right to fish pursuant to
the statute.

But the court then went beyond the statute and

judicially adopted the pleasure boat test contained in People v.
~ack,

supra.

This rule, it was held, provided a public right of

use for all lawful purposes, not merely fishing.

Thus, the court

said that in Idaho:
Any stream, which, in its natural state will float
logs or any other commercial or floatable commodity,
or is capable of being navigated by oar or motor
propelled small craft, for pleasure or commercial
purposes, is navigable.
This holding was based on a recognition that the State of
Idaho held title to all waters of the state in trust for the
public, subject to rights of appropriation.
15, §l.

Idaho Constit. Art.

Thus, the court reasoned, there exists a public easement

for a right-of-way through and upon natural water channels.
court stated that the issue of navigability is simply one of
several tests to determine a body of water's suitability for
public use:
Appellant urges this Court to adhere to the test
of navigability that is used in federal actions
where title to stream beds is at issue. However,
the auestion of title to the bed of Silver Creek
is not at issue in this proceeding. This is not
an action bv the State of Idaho or respondent to
auiet title.to the bed of a naviqable stream.
It
is an action to declare the riahts of the public
to use a navigable stream.
The federal test of
navigability involving as it does propert~ t~tle
auestions does not preclude a less restrictive
~tate test of navigability establishing a right
of public passage wherever a strear:1 is physically
navigable by small craft.
(528 P.2d at 1298).
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The

For other cases where the courts have upheld the public's
recreational rights in waters, see:
791

Duval v. Thomas, 114

(Fla. 1959); Harris v. Brooks, 283 Sil 2d 129

so.

;
2

(11.rY:. 1955);

Burt v. Meunger, 23 Nl'J 2d 117 (Mich. 1946); lie Bo Shone Ass'n
State, 227 !lW 2d 358 (Mich. APP. 1975); Diana Shootina club v.
Hurling, 145 Nl'l 816

(lhsc. 1914); and Branch v. Oconto county,

109 NW 2d 105 (lhsc. 1961).

See also:

R. L. Knuth, Public Picrr.'

of Recreation in Utah's Non-Navigable l'laters, 5 Jou:rnal of ContE··
porary Law 95

( 1978) , and Johnson and Austin, Recreational Righ::

and Title to Beds on vJestern Lakes and Streams, 7 iiatural Resourc:
L.J. 1 (1967).
It should be emphasized at this point that the State of Uta:.
is not claiming that the public has a right to trespass on the
Appellant's property in order to fish at Lake Canyon Lake,

a~

the trial court correctly held that the public has no such righu ·
However, the day may come when the public, for whatever reason, '
may be provided with such access.

If the State, through its

Division of Wildlife Resources, were to grant Appellant the righ:
I

to operate Lake Canyon Lake as a private fish installation, this

i
I

would be impairing and violating its obligation to hold the natur:1
water of the state in trust for the people, and its obligation to
protect the public's recreation rights therein.
In short, public recreational rights in the natural lakes
and streams of the western states have long been recognized,
whether under the "pleasure boat" test or the public trust test.
The Utah Legislature, through Section 2 3-15-10, Utah Code Annotat<1953, as amended, has souqht to protect the natural waters
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of thE

i

I

_l

state from being converted to private fish farms to the detriment
of the rights of the public.

The challenged statute offers just

that protection, and is thus a lawful exercise of state powers
and is fully constitutional.
POINT I I
THERE ARE A FEW MATTERS \·JHICH REQUIRE CLARIFICATION
A.

Public Rights of Recreation and Private Water Rights
Are Not In conflict
It was explained and stipulated at the trial that there

was absolutely no conflict between public recreational rights in
natural watercourses and private water rights (R. 349).

The

public trust and public rights apply only to waters while they
remain in natural lakes and streams.
95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648

(1937).

Ada~s

v. Portage Irr. Co.,

Private water rights are acquired

under state law by diverting water from natural lakes and streams
and applying it to beneficial uses.

See, generally, Title 73,

Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

Thus, it was

made abundantly clear that the potential conflict between public
rights and private rights was in reality no conflict at all, and
even if there were a conflict, the appropriator would prevail.
B.

The water in Lake Canyon Lake Is Not Appropriated by
Appellant
At the trial and in Appellant's brief (page 15), much

ado was made of the fact that Appellant had appropriated all of
the waters in Lake canyon Lake.

But that is not the case!

Ap-

pellant has a "diligence" water right which entitles it to allow
livestock to water in Lake Canyon Lake, and has an unapproved
application on file with the State Engineer to appropriate water
from the Sponsored
stream
fromFunding
the
lakeprovided
to byirrigate
lands
below
by the flowing
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the lake.

But Appellant does not own any water in the lake ano

has not cited any evidence or authority whatsoever to support
such a clail'1.

Indeed, the Utah cases and statutes cited above

uniformly preclude any such result.

In any event, any recrea-

tional uses of the lake cannot and would not impair any vested
water rights, and any argument along these lines is factually
misconceived and legally irrelevant.
C.

The Private Pond Permit on the "Lower Lake" Is Justifi:.'
There was also much ado at the trial about issuance of

a private pond permit for another natural lake in Lake Canyon
several miles below Lake Canyon Lake.

Appellant

contended~~

the state was inconsistent in renewing a permit for the lower
lake while denying its application.

But Donald lmdriano, Chief

of Fisheries for the Division of Wildlife Resources, gave an
entirely candid and uncontroverted explanation.
The permit for the lower lake was issued many years ago,
before the Utah law was amended in 1971 to expressly prohibit
such permits on natural watercourses.

The permit has been

reM~·

annually, even though such renewal might have been in violatioo
of Section 23-15-10 since its amendment in 1971.

However, the

holder of the permit had made substantial and expensive installations prior to 1971, in reliance on continued private pond
status for the lower lake.

Mr. Andriano said that he did not

know whether the 1971 statute contemplated any "grandfather"
rights for continuation of pre-1971 permits on natural watercourses, but until there was such a legal determination, such
permits probably would be renewed because of the previous exper.·
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

d1tures.

He said he did not know how many permits were in that

category, but his estimate would be no more than half a dozen (R.
~21-423).

The situation with respect to the lower lake is exceedingly
simple.

The existing private pond permit for the lake may or

may not be legal.

But that is not an issue in this case.

It

plainly would be a direct violation of Section 23-15-10 if the
state were to issue a private pond permit to Appellant for Lake
Canyon Lake, and no comparison with the lower lake can change
that fact.
D.

Appellant Is Not Being Denied Reasonable Use of Lake
Canyon Lake or Its Real Property
It is important to point out that by denying an appli-

cation for a permit to use Lake Canyon Lake for a private fish
installation, the state is not denying or infringing upon any of
Appellant's rights.

Appellant will still have the right to deny

public access from the public road to the shore of Lake Canyon
Lake, and will therefore have exclusive access to fish the lake,
subject, of course, to the license, season, and creel limit
restrictions set forth in the state's general fishing proclamation.

Appellant will still have full use of its land, may

build its fishing lodge, and water its livestock pursuant to its
Water User Claim.

All that is being denied the Appellant is

something that it clearly is not entitled to~that is, to convert
a natural body of water, which is held by the state in trust for
the public, to its own private, exclusive use as a private fish
farm.

such is not an unreasonable, inequitable or unconstitutional

result.
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POINT III
THE ROAD UP LAKE

Cfu~YON

IS A PUBLIC ROAD

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in rulinq t\
the road up Lake Canyon is a public road.

However, ?ppellant

does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to support
such a finding.

Rather, Appellant claims that the issue of the

nature of the road was simply not a valid issue as framed by the
pleadings.

While the public road issue !".ay not have been spe-

cifically framed in the pleadings, it certainly became a hotly
controverted issue of fact on which both parties offered evidenc
and on which the court requested evidence.

No one was

surpriH~

by the issue.
Initially, the issue of the road was raised in the afficla•:::
of Clair Huff in support of the state's Motion for Summary Jude·,
rnent (R. 41).

Mr. Huff stated that Lake Canyon Lake was access::

to the public by a public gravel road (R. 41).

Appellant

fil~·

counter-affidavit by Robert J. Pinder, in which Mr. Pinder allec'.
that the road was a private road.

2

Appellant then filed a memo·

randum in opposition to the state's Motion for Summary Judgment
in which Appellant argued that there were many issues of

contr~

verted fact requiring evidence, including whether the road was
public or private (R.

53).

On December 13, 1979 the court denied the state's Motion fc:
Summary Judgment based, in part, on Appellant's assertion that

2 see also the photo attached to Mr. Finder's affidavit iR·

-26-
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there existed controverted issues of fact.

~.mong

the matters on

1hich the court wanted to hear evidence was "whether the road

1

leading to the lake is a public right-of-way"

(R. 119).

At the opening of the trial, the court again requested a
t

list of the issues to be tried, and the following exchange took

he

place:
MR. QUEALY: Your Honor, I might say one
thing at this point. When Mr. Cotro-Manes was
swnrnarizing the issues and the burden of going
forward, I think he left out two important issues
that we are prepared to go forward on and that is
on our Counterclaim as to the recreational--the
[susceptibility] of that lake as to recreational
navigability, and we are prepared to go forward
on that.
The Court I believe in its Memorandum
Decision, also, listed as one of the issues whether
that was a public road going up there and we have
witnesses and are prepared to proceed on that
unless Mr. Cotro-Manes no lonqer thinks that's a
controverted issue.

sei

]q-

MR. COTRO-~.ANES:
ward with that.

;s1:.·

THE COURT:

I think we should go for-

And whose burden--

MR. QUEALY: On that I think it's Mr. CotroManes' claim that it was not a public road, so I
think the burden there is on him.

ec'.

MR. COTRO-MANES:
I think it's almost the
burden of the person who claims it's public to
prove it's public.

o-

THE COURT: Well, we will worry about that
particular aspect as we move forward with the
issues that were first identified as Mr. Cotror:anes' position (R. 292-293) (Emphasis added).

o·

Evidence was then given by witnesses for both sides as to
(o:

the

nature of the Lake Canyon Road.

There can thus be no ques-

tion that while the public nature of the road may not have been
specifically framed as an issue in the early pleadings, it certainly became an issue as stated in the court's first memorandum
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decision.
ingly.

Everybody knew this was an issue and proceeded

For Appellant to now claim that such adJ'udicati'on is
· no·,.

invalid is ludicrous!

Rule 15, Utah Pules of Civil Procedure,.

clear enough:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
(Emphasis added) .
Both sides offered evidence as to the nature of the road,
and the court properly found that the road was public (R. 180-U:
It should also be noted that, for purposes of determining
public rights in natural watercourses, it is legally

irreleva~

whether the road up Lake Canyon is a public or private road.
However, the evidence was overwhelming that the road was public.
Duchesne County treated it as a public road and graded and mai~
tained it at county expense (R.

356-360; 362-364).

'i'he general

public has used the road as a public road for at least half a
century (since before 1930)

(R.

379; 386; 395-396).

In Utah, roads used by the public for ten years or more au
conclusively deemed to be public roads by implied dedication.
Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
also:

see

Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127 (1916); ~

Land & Livestock v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646 (1930); ~
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941).

There ca:

be no doubt that the Lake Canyon Road is a public road, at leas:
toSponsored
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant claims that the statute prohibiting the issuance of private fish installation permits on natural lakes or
streams is unconstitutional because there is no reasonable basis
for distinguishinq between natural bodies of water and artificial
facilities.

The State contends that there are important and

valid public policy reasons for prohibiting such installations
on natural bodies of water, the foremost being that to allow
such private facilities impairs the public's right to utilize
the public waters of this state which are suitable for recreational purposes, and would violate the state's position as
trustee for the water and wildlife resources of the State.

To

hand over the natural lakes and streams to private ownership
would, in the words of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Lamprey
case, supra, "be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the
extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated."

Sec-

tion 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, regulating
the issuance of private fish installation permits on natural
lakes and streams was passed to protect these public interests,
is fully constitutional, and should be upheld.

day of January, 1981.

DATED this
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